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Are Chinese Companies Taking Over the World?
Mitchell Silk and Richard Malish*t
I. INTRODUCTION: Go WEST YOUNG MAN
Reminiscent of America's drive west in search of valuable resources and
economic growth, China is pursuing its own manifest destiny with an aggressive
outward economic expansion program. The drive spans across many key sectors
and touches on virtually every resource-rich country in the world. The drivers
behind the program are few and rather simple: China is looking beyond its
borders to sate its enormous domestic demands (focusing primarily on energy,
minerals and agriculture) and to develop international markets (including
distribution and after-market service channels) for its growing manufacturing
sector. Spearheading the campaign are a number of increasingly world-class
domestic companies. These companies have long held select advantages to their
foreign competitors, including access to cheap labor and benefits bestowed by
the state, that have allowed them to grow competitive internationally. And over
the last few years, Chinese government policy has actively encouraged the global
ambitions of China's corporations and banks. Chinese companies are
dominating global exports and a number are starting to purchase significant
stakes in foreign assets and reputable foreign companies.
Yet despite the vast potential of Chinese companies to compete globally,
there exists an equal number of systemic issues which have hampered Chinese
growth. Companies are still held back by issues such as bureaucratic red tape and
corruption, a lag in management and international experience and a growing
distrust by foreign targets. Banks are hindered in their own growth and in fully
assisting the global drive by problems such as non-performing loans and internal
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restructuring. The resolution of these issues will tell us not whether Chinese
companies will take over the world, but when.
II. CHINESE COMPANIES COME OF AGE
The rise of Chinese companies. comes during a time of unparalleled growth
for the country. China's economy grew by a top-ranking average 9.9 percent
between 1993 and 2004.' It accounts for 4 percent of the world economy and its
foreign trade is worth $851 billion, the third largest national total in the world.2
China is predicted to become the world's biggest economy by purchasing-
power-parity as early as 2017.
Fueling China's growth are a number of national champions 4 ready to
compete with blue-chip multinationals in cost and technology. This select few
own vast assets, generate healthy profits and many have successfully listed
subsidiaries on New York and other top-tier exchanges. Sixteen of these
companies made the 2005 Fortune Global 500, an annual list of the world's
leading firms based on revenue, the most of any developing economy.' Chinese
companies benefit from a high level of research and development, a rapidly
growing, but still inadequate, infrastructure of roads, ports and telecoms
networks (reducing transaction costs and turnaround times) and an educated and
low-cost workforce.6 The main order of the day for these companies is to digest
a great deal of modern technology and make their way up the steep learning
curve of acquiring the management skills necessary to compete domestically and
globally.
Growing pains notwithstanding, Chinese companies have become sought-
after partners for multinational companies. Chinese partners have used these
1 China Lifts Annual Growth Figures, BBC News (Jan 9, 2006), available online at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4594132.stm> (visited May 15, 2006).
2 Zheng Bijian, China's 'Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status, Foreign Affairs 18 (Sept/Oct 2005).
3 The World in 2026, Economist (part of The World in 2006 special issue), available online at
<http://www.economist.com/theworldin/international/displayStory.cfm?storyid=5134720
&d=2006> (visited May 26, 2006).
4 For a brief description of China's "national champions," see Survy: We Are the Champions,
Economist 12 (Mar 20, 2004).
5 Fortune Global 500, Fortune, available online at <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
global500/countries/C.html> (visited May 15, 2006). The list runs the gamut of industries, such
as old economy companies China First Automotive Works and Shanghai Baosteel Group, China
Mobile Communications, China Telecommunications, trading giant COFCO and financial
companies such as China Life Insurance and the "Big Four" state-owned commercial banks.
6 Ted C. Fishman, How China Will Change Your Business, Inc. Magazine 70, 76 (Mar 2005). China's
research and development expenditures rank third only to the US and Japan, which is
extraordinary given the difference in purchasing power.
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joint ventures as a platform to develop their own capabilities, cultivate
management skills and learn basic international standards. For example, China's
semiconductor industry has grown through joint ventures, resulting in the gap
between US and Chinese manufacturing technology narrowing from between 7
to 10 years in 1986 to 2 years or less.7 China can now produce chips that are only
one generation behind current technology. Ningbo Bird Company, one of the
few private success stories, started out as a contract manufacturing supplier for
Motorola and now rivals Motorola in the Chinese cellular handset market.
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation ("SAIC"), joint venture partner to
both General Motors and Volkswagen, plans to sell its own cars in China by the
end of 2006 and to export cars to Europe in 2007. SAIC asserted the relocation
of technical and R&D facilities along with manufacturing plants to China has
"furnished China with conditions and opportunities to independently develop its
own international brands."8
Chief among China's champions are its oil majors: China National
Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC," widely known through its subsidiary
PetroChina), Sinopec and Sinochem, each Fortune Global 500 companies, and
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (oftentimes operating through its
Hong Kong-listed subsidiary, CNOOC Ltd. ("CNOOC")). Each successfully
carried out initial public offerings between 2000 and 2002, raising billions of
dollars in foreign capital. They have entered into a number of multi-billion dollar
joint ventures with foreign competitors. In a sign of growing independence,
CNPC recently dropped plans for substantial foreign equity participation in its
$18 billion trans-China natural gas "West-to-East pipeline" in 2005. Seeing
foreign investors' demands as too onerous, CNPC decided to carry out the
project itself.9
Chinese competitors have also carved out niche markets in developed
countries. TCL Corp is the world's largest TV maker by production volume.'
0
Galanz manufactures one out of every three microwave ovens in the world."
Haier, a white-goods manufacturer, has offices in more than 100 countries,
overseas revenues of more than $1 billion and has carved out more than 50
7 General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Rapid Advances in China's Semiconductor Industry
Underscore Needfor Fundamental U.S. Pohg Reiew, GAO-02-620, 2, 11 (Apr 2002).
8 Keith Bradsher, Chinese Partner of GM and VW to Offer Its Own Cars, NY Times 6 (Apr 11, 2006).
9 The foreign investors asked CNPC to guarantee a 15 percent return on investment. See PetroChina
Drops Foreign Partners on P oehne, China Daily (Aug 4, 2004), available online at <http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/04/content_357832.htm> (visited May 15, 2006); Energy
Information Administration County Anaysis Brefs: China, available online at <http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html> (visited May 15, 2006).
10 Watch Outfor the New National Champions, EIU RiskWire (Nov 17, 2003).
11 Ming Zeng and Peter Wiliamson, The Hidden Dragons, Harv Bus Rev 92 (Oct 2003).
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percent of the US compact refrigerator market and 11 percent in freezers. 2
Despite the higher costs, it has established twenty-two overseas factories,
including one in South Carolina, to avoid anti-dumping fines. 3 The impressive
list goes on.
Not only are Chinese companies investing heavily in overseas production,
but they are beginning to snap up established companies in developed countries
as well. China's outbound direct investment ("ODI")4 was $6.9 billion in 2005
and it is predicted to grow by 22 percent a year up to 2010.' By the end of 2004,
over five thousand Chinese enterprises had invested directly in nearly two
hundred countries or regions.' 6
Lenovo Group, for example, acquired IBM's PC business in 2004 and
introduced its first eponymous-branded computers into the US consumer
market in 2006.17 The oil giants have been some of the most active players. In
2005, CNOOC purchased a $2.3 billion stake in an oil and gas field in the
Nigerian delta.18 In the same year, CNPC acquired PetroKazakhstan, a
Canadian-listed company operating in Kazakhstan, for $4.18 billion, the largest
overseas acquisition ever by a Chinese company.19 China is also investing heavily
in oil and mineral as'sets in Latin America.2 °
12 China Goes Global, Swedish Chamber of Commerce Dragon News No 4, 11 (2005)
<http://www.swedcham.com.hk/pdf/DragonNews4_2005.pdf> (visited May 15, 2006).
13 Haier 'Local Resources" Are Ky Overseas, Bus Wk Online (Nov 8, 2004), available online at
<http:/www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_45/b3907008.htm> (visited May 15,
2006).
14 Foreign direct investment ("FDI' ) is comprised of equity investment, reinvested earnings
(earnings not distributed as dividends and earnings of branches not remitted to the direct
investor) and intercompany debt transactions. FDI originating in China and directed outside of
the country is herein ieferred to as outbound direct investment ("ODI").
15 China's Direct Investment Overseas Rises, Bus Wk Online (Jan 23, 2006), available online at
<http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8FA7TP80.htm?campaign-id=apn-home-
"down&chan=db> (visited Feb 11, 2006); Andrew Yeh, China's Champions Run Risks Overseas, Fin
Times 2 (Apr 5, 2006).
16 Kenny Zhang, Going Global Thy Why, When, Where and How of Chinese Companies' Outward Investment
Intentions 11 (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2005), available online at <http://www.
asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/pdfs/can in asia/ciachinaglobal.pdf> (visited Feb 11, 2006).
17 See Jamil Anderlini, Showing the World China's Can-Do Spirit: Lenovo Stunned the Market with What It
Could Do with IBM's PC Business, South China Morning Post 1 (Apr 21, 2006).
18 See Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, CNOOC Takes
45% Stake in Nigerian Oil (Jan 10, 2006), available online at <http://www.china-embassy.org/
eng/gyzg/t230362.htm> (visited May 15, 2006).
19 See China's CN\PC in $4.2bn Canada Bid, BBC News (Aug 22, 2005), available online at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4172934.stm> (visited May 15, 2006).
20 See Mitchell Silk and Richard Malish, Hola Comrade: Latin American Firms Prepare for the Chinese Gold
Rush, Latin Lawyer 43 (Sept 1, 2005).
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The growth of these Chinese companies is so substantial that
multinationals are now shaping their business plans to counter the China threat.
Managers are reading books on how to learn from China's growth while
manufacturers and service providers are outsourcing to China to benefit from its
competitive advantages. Others are bracing themselves against the storm. In one
example, the planned merger of telecommunications equipment makers Alcatel
and Lucent may be driven by the growing threat of Chinese upstarts Huawei
Technologies Co. ("Huawei") and ZTE Corp.21 If Chinese companies are not
taking over the world, non-Chinese companies now recognize that they are
certainly a force to be reckoned with.
III. STATE SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL EXPANSION
The largest overseas acquisitions have aimed to lock in long-term supplies
of strategic resources. China's domestic consumption is growing at astounding
rates, and Beijing has adopted a mercantilist energy-security policy, attempting to
secure reliable sources of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, metals, ores
and coal for domestic use. A key hallmark of the policy is for national oil
companies to gain access to overseas oil and gas resources. These companies are
also encouraged to outsource operations in order to reduce pollution, preclude
surplus capacity and promote international distribution.
Another significant factor driving Chinese companies to expand their
global footprint is the acquisition of corporate infrastructure necessary to
expand in key markets or to find new markets and grow their business, often
due to loss of domestic market share. 23 For example, Lenovo's decision to buy
IBM's computer unit resulted from steady encroachment by foreign brands such
as Dell into its domestic market.24 Haier's 2005 bid for US-based Maytag was an
attempt to further penetrate the US market as part of their already successful
global campaign. Chinese companies are also looking for brand recognition and
21 Sara Silver, et al, In Lucent Deal, Two Rivals Face Inroads from China, Wall St J Al (Mar 25, 2006).
22 Overseas Investment Survyed, China Daily (July 31, 2003) (quoting a survey from Roland Berger
Strategy Consultants), available online at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-07/31/
content_250456.htm> (visited Feb 12, 2006).
23 According to a 2003 survey of China's fifty largest "industry-leading" firms, over 50 percent listed
seeking new markets, especially as a result of competitive pressures from multinational
competitors, as the overriding imperative for ODI. 20 percent were looking outward to "secure
natural resources," and 16 percent specified "obtaining key technology" as the critical reason for
making international acquisitions. Id, quoting a survey from Roland Berger Strategy Consultants.
24 See Mary Hennock, Lenovo: The Making ofa Legend?, BBC News (Dec 8, 2004), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4078301.stm> (visited May 15, 2006).
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access to international distribution.25 By acquiring Thomson's-RCA's TV line
and Alcatel's cell-phone business, TCL now owns Western brand names,
distribution networks in Europe and a bundle of Western technology.
Beijing is playing a major role behind the scenes to support these efforts,
both preparing the nest to hatch an ensemble of national champions to
accomplish these tasks and rearing them to spread their wings globally.
A. NATIONAL CHAMPIONS
Like most developed states at some point in their development China has
an industrial policy which encourages the growth of a number of globally
competitive "national champions." Japan had keiretsu and South Korea had
chaebol, both private conglomerates nurtured by strong government agencies.
However, Beijing, wary of a powerful private sector, has nurtured state-owned
enterprises ("SOEs"), which today are believed to account for about one-third
of China's economy.
26
SOEs enjoy a range of benefits from their majority shareholder-chief
among them being monopoly status and profitable government contracts. Other
benefits include information sharing networks, domestic tax breaks, cheap land
and preferential access for public listing. Lenovo received technical assistance
for its PCs and servers from the more than fifty-eight thousand staff of its
former majority parent, the Chinese Academy of Science.27 Some SOEs have
received support for global campaigns to recruit top executives and assistance
with corporate matchmaking.21 Consequently, ODI by SOEs comprised 43
percent of total ODI by the end of 2003.
25 As of 2005, China had still not placed in Business Week's list of the world's top 100 brands,
although Haier has ranked in a list maintained by World Brand Laboratory. Top 100 Global Brands
Scoreboard, Bus Wk Online (2005), available online at <http://bwnt.businessweek.com/brand/
2005> (visited May 15, 2006); Haier Listed in Worl's Top 100 Recognizable Brands, China Daily (Feb
3, 2004), available online at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-02/03/content_
302645.htm> (visited May 15, 2006).
26 The Myth of China Inc, Economist 63 (Sept 3, 2005).
27 Frederik Balfour, The State's LongApron Strings, Bus Wk 76 (Aug 22, 2005); see Chinese Academy
of Sciences, Fact Sheet, available online at <http://english.cas.ac.cn/eng2003/page/about_
03.htm> (visited Feb 18, 2006).
28 Sun Min, Foreign Talent to Heo Upgrade SOEs, China Daily (June 25, 2004), available online at
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/25/content_342426.htm> (visited Feb
11, 2006). For example, when Arcelor, Europe's top steelmaker, and Tokyo-based Nippon Steel
were looking to invest in China, Beijing led them to Baosteel, which needed technological
assistance making high-grade steel for car manufacturing. The result is a $785 million state-of-the-
art plant in Shanghai that will churn out 1.2 million tons annually of cold-rolled steel for the auto
industry. Balfour, The State's LongApron Strings, Bus Wk at 76 (cited in note 27).
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However, many SOEs are less efficient than their global competitors. They
operate in order to maintain social stability, maintaining employment and
providing benefits to current and former employees. The economic losses of
SOEs rose 56.7 percent to $12.75 billion in 2005, a 16-year high growth rate.29
Aware of the burden many SOEs place on the economy, Beijing initiated a
process of restructuring in 1998 under the doctrine of "grasp the big, let go the
small" (zhuadafangxiao; l1 ,J,), focusing its support on and encouraging the
consolidation of China's biggest and best companies.3 ° This policy was later
refined when the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission ("SASAC") was established in April 2003 as a holding company for
large SOEs such as CNOOC's parent company and nearly 190 other Chinese
enterprises. SASAC was given the task to build thirty to fifty of its best SOEs
into "national champions," or globally-competitive multinationals, by 2010. To
accomplish this task, SASAC is forcing some of the enterprises under its
supervision to merge or transfer assets and is allowing some listed SOEs to
transfer part of their state-owned stakes to foreign or domestic strategic
investors.31 Many of the Chinese companies which are making global headlines
are beneficiaries of these efforts.
B. GOING GLOBAL
During the early years of the Communist era, China's central government
directly funded all investments in what has been called the "Investment System."
The Central Government was, understandably, focused on major challenges in
domestic economic development. To the extent foreign economic issues became
relevant, it was more in the area of directing and regulating foreign direct
investment ("FDI") into China, of which there was considerable activity. Yet
the Central Government saw outbound investment as secondary and wielded
29 SOEs' Losses Climb 56.7% to US$12.75b, Xinhua Shanghai Daily (Mar 27, 2006), available online at
<http://www.shanghaidaily.com/art/2006/03/28/255045/SOEs 039_losses_climb_56_7
toUS_12_75b.htm> (visited Mar 27, 2006).
30 See We Are the Champions, Economist at 12 (cited in note 4).
31 Id. See also SASAC Announces Five Measures to Promote China's SOE Reform, People's Daily (Nov 20,
2003) available online at <http://english.people.com.cn/200311/20/eng2003l120_
128595.shtml> (visited May 26, 2006).
32 China has gradually opened the door to FDI since the Reform and Open Door Policy was
promulgated in 1978. FDI was initially limited to Special Enterprise Zones in select coastal cities.
Foreign enterprises were granted preferential treatment, although repatriation of profits was
limited. The second phase of the open door policy lifted the ban on foreign capital investment in
certain domestic enterprises and loosened the ban on profit repatriation. Tariffs have been
reduced throughout this period. The momentum towards greater access continued this decade
with membership in the World Trade Organization resulting in the standardization of a large
number of China's laws and regulations and the prospect of further tariff reductions.
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control on a piecemeal basis from 1979 until the early 1980s as the State Council
gave case-by-case approval of the few outbound investments. The Ministry of
Commerce's ("MOFCOM's") predecessor agency attempted to create a
standardized procedure for outbound investment by enacting regulations in the
1980s, but a string of state asset losses in Hong Kong real estate and stock
market speculation kept the door from swinging open.33
As Chinese companies established themselves locally, Beijing developed a
policy of ZoU chuqu, or go out, often translated as "Go Global. 34 The policy
encourages Chinese companies with comparative advantages to engage in ODI
and acquisitions in a more active manner and enhance their international
competitiveness. Go Global also complements the government's desire to
relieve inflationary pressures on the renminbi by investing foreign reserves
abroad.35
A number of regulations have been passed to facilitate the Go Global
policy. As China's currency is not yet freely convertible, measures to facilitate
foreign exchange have been crucial. One of the first regulations to facilitate ODI
was a 2003 circular authorizing certain trial provincial-level State Administration
of Foreign Exchange ("SAFE") branches to provide final foreign exchange
approval for investments under $3 million (other provincial level offices were
limited to investments under $1 million) and to approve the transfer of
performance deposits and other early stage funds.36 In addition, companies no
longer needed to receive final approval for the transaction before the
performance deposit could be transferred. In early 2005, China increased the
total amount of foreign currency Chinese companies can buy each year for ODI
purposes to $5 billion from the earlier limit of $3.3 billion and SAFE has
announced its attention to eventually eliminate this quota.37
Until 2004, all ODI was subject to examination and approval by the
National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC") and MOFCOM in
33 See Zhang, Going Global at 6 (cited in note 16).
34 See Mure Dickie, Starting a Walk on the Wide Side, FT.com (Oct 18, 2005), available online at
<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/94015e54-3fc4-1 lda-8394-00000e251 lc8,dwp-uuid=ebc4eb46-
3fe3-11 da-8394-00000e2511 c8.html> (visited Feb 18, 2006).
35 The renminbi (abbreviated "RMB") is the official currency of the People's Republic of China. The
base unit is the yuan.
36 State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Issues Relevant to Further Intensifying the Reform
of Foreign Exchange Administration on External Investments Circular
(- (Oct 15, 2003), available online at
<http://www.safe.gov.cn/law/law429.htm> (SAFE website; Chinese) (visited Feb 11, 2006).
37 Cbina's Direct Investment Overseas Rises to $6.9 Bln, China Daily (Jan 23, 2006), available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01 /23/content_4088906.htm> (visited Feb 11,
2006).
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a procedure that had not advanced far from the early days of the Investment
System. The authorities would examine detailed information about the
commercial value, financing arrangements, feasibility and even the technological
aspects of each proposed transaction. In the earlier waves of ODI, this approval
process was quite cumbersome and introduced a degree of uncertainty in terms
of transaction management. Such uncertainty translated into completion risk in
the eyes of foreign sellers and worked against Chinese buyers in competitive
bids.
In recognition of the importance of certainty in the process and timing as a
means to bolster the Chinese corporate's competitive edge, the State Council
issued the Reform of the Investment System Decision in July 2004, which
dramatically reformed the process for ODI.38 Government scrutiny is now
generally restricted to investments involving government financing. All other
investments are subject to a simplified approval or registration system. 9
Investments subject to the approval system are only required to submit an
application report and scrutiny is limited to strategic issues such as economic
security, anti-monopoly, utilization of natural resources, environmental
protection and the public interest. Experienced sellers now consider completion
risk due to Chinese domestic oversight to be a much less significant factor in
weighing a Chinese offer. The Chinese legal position is a clear showing of
legislator pragmatism in order to bolster Chinese bidder competitiveness.
Another level of support has come in the form of information and
guidance. For example, in July 2004, MOFCOM and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs jointly issued the Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment
Guidance Catalogue. 4° This Catalogue sets out a list of preferred industry sectors
in sixty-eight countries shaped both by Beijing's impressions of previous
endeavors and perceived prospects for future success.4' Preferred investments
benefit from a broad range of incentives offering priority access to financing and
foreign exchange, tax concessions and preferential customs treatment.
MOFCOM is also establishing an information bank for Chinese enterprises
which intend to expand overseas.
38 State Council, Reform of the Investment System Decision (effective July 16, 2004), available
online at <http://pep.mofcom.gov.cn/aartide/cp/ci/dc/200407/20040700254177.html>
(Chinese) (visited Feb 11, 2006).
39 Transactions subject to the approval system are detailed in the Catalogue of Investments Subject
to Government Approval.
40 MOFCOM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (331XA , flR?' Jfi-,-l Hiik) (effective July 8,
2004), available online at <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bi/200407/20040700251628.
html> (Chinese) (visited Feb 11, 2006).
41 Id.
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Beijing has also actively promoted Chinese investment on high-level
diplomatic missions and has helped Chinese companies secure contracts or
exploration rights abroad. China has signed bilateral investment treaties with 113
countries and double taxation treaties with 75 countries.42 It has also played
matchmaker for Chinese companies and their global suppliers and consumers."
For example, some four hundred agreements and business deals were signed
during Chinese President Hu Jintao's trip to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba in
November 2004. 4 President Hu announced plans to invest $100 billion in Latin
America over the following ten years, with $8.5 billion earmarked for Brazil in
port, railway, oil, steel and aviation projects and $19.7 billion earmarked for
Argentina in railway, oil, gas and construction projects. Several of these
agreements have already begun to bear fruit. For example, a preliminary
$1 billion agreement between Brazil's state-run oil company Petrobras, the
Export & Import Bank of China ("China EXIM") and Sinopec to finance the
construction of the Gasene natural gas pipeline in Brazil developed into a formal
$239 million agreement in April 2006 for the construction of an initial stretch of
the pipeline.4"
These reforms are the tip of the iceberg and many more reforms are
needed to allow Chinese companies to invest abroad with the same ease as
companies in the US or other open market economies. Beijing has recognized
42 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Total Number of Bilateral Investment
Agreements Concluded, I June 2005, available online at <http://www.unctad.org> (visited May 15,
2006).
43 See Sun Min, Foreign Talent to Heo Upgrade SOEs, China Daily (cited in note 28).
44 China's Influence in the Western Hemisphere, Hearing before the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (2005),
available online at <http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/pas/irc/video/gov/132t.htm> (visited
Feb 11, 2006); Trade & Investment, Latin American Special Reports (May 2, 2006).
4 Brawl, China Sign Gas Pipeline Deal, Associated Press (Apr 18, 2006); Juliette Kerr, Petrobras Signs
Pipeline Contract with Sinopec, Global Insight (Apr 18, 2006). In addition, China announced after the
trip that it would invest more than $500 million in Cuba's nickel industry, pursuant to which
China Minmetals is currently pursuing a joint venture in the country. Frances Robles, Trade between
Cuba and China Soars, Miami Herald 1 (Jan 8, 2006); Eric Ng, Minmetals Closes in on Cuba Project,
South China Morning Post 1 (Sept 9, 2005). CNPC committed to spending a further $400 million
in developing Venezuelan oil and gas reserves as a result of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's
visit to Beijing in December 2004 and Chinese Vice-President Zeng Qinghong's visit to
Venezuela in January 2005. Congressional Research Service, Cbina's Growing Interest in Latin
America 3-4 (Apr 20, 2005), available online at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/45464.pdf> (visited May 15, 2005).
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the task and has affirmed that in the future, the Chinese government "will
provide more beneficial conditions for Chinese enterprises to 'go global.'
' 46
IV. FINANCING GLOBAL EXPANSION
In addition to incentives and non-financial support from the government,
Chinese companies have also benefited from access to Beijing's coffers, either
through favorable lending by Chinese banks or direct contribution of capital.
For example, in its bid for Unocal, CNOOC would have received a $7 billion
intercompany loan from its state-owned majority shareholder consisting of a no-
interest $2.5 billion bridge loan to have been refinanced through the sale of
shares in two years and a 3.5 percent-interest $4.5 billion loan with a 30-year
tenor.4" Furthermore, no interest would have been due if CNOOC's credit rating
fell below investment grade, contrary to normal market standards.
Under China's planned economy, Chinese banks have traditionally met
government policy goals by financing the operations of SOEs, regardless of their
profitability or risk.48  The US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission ("USCC"), a congressional agency established specifically to
investigate and report on the national security implications of trade and the
economic relationship between the two countries, argues that these credits
"amount to a massive government subsidy for Chinese firms" and that China's
$875 billion in foreign reserves, accumulated in large part due to Beijing's long-
standing trade surplus with the US, can be used to finance acquisitions abroad.49
46 Bo Xilai, Speech at the International Investment Forum (Sept 22, 2005), available online at
<http://ph2.mofcom.gov.cn/aartide/chinanews/200509/20050900439071.html> (visited May
15, 2006).
47 See John Bishop, CNOOC Using Cash, Loans in Unocal Bid; Goldman/JPMorgan Offer Bt dge,
Forbes.com (June 23, 2005), available online at <http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/
afx/2005/06/23/afx2107339.html> (visited May 15, 2006). Inter-company loans are common
means of increasing liquidity among corporate group members and typically involve loans from a
parent to an affiliate so the latter can either expand an existing facility or make a strategic
acquisition. Bridge loans are short-term loans to cover immediate cash requirements, usually lent
at a premium, until permanent financing can be arranged.
48 Reforming Cbina's Banking System, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, No
2002-17 (May 31, 2002), available online at <http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/
letter/2002/el2002-l7.html> (visited May 15, 2006).
49 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2005 Rep to Congress, 109th Cong, 1st
Sess 39 (Nov 2005), available online at <http://www.uscc.gov/annual.report/2005/
annuaLreport.full_05.pdf> (visited Feb 11, 2006); Richard McGregor, China Remains Vulnerable to
lUquidity Shock Despite Launching War on Bad Debt, Fin Times 11 (May 4, 2006). US foreign policy
has vociferously pressured China to revalue its currency to resolve the trade imbalance-ignoring
for the moment that a stronger renminbi would make Chinese acquisitions cheaper. China has
begun the process of relaxing its currency's peg to the US dollar, and anticipated further reforms
will likely help resolve this issue.
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CNOOC has taken the hardest direct beating for its $6 million bridge loan from
state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ("ICBC"). The loan was
even attacked in US Congressional resolutions against the transaction, although
there is evidence to suggest it would have been provided at market rates.50
Soft credit, driven by lending by China's state-owned commercial banks
("SOCBs") and policy banks, has always been critical to meeting the ongoing
cash requirements of SOEs and is a growing factor in financing global
acquisitions. As these banks continue to restructure, harmonize their corporate
governance and risk management with international standards and become more
experienced in international transactions, they will enhance the competitiveness
of China's global development.
A. STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS
Due in large part because of restrictions in the capital markets, Chinese
enterprises continue to rely overwhelmingly on commercial banks for their
financing needs. The Big Four-ICBC, China Construction Bank ("CCB"),
Bank of China ("BoC' and Agricultural Bank of China-currently provide 70
percent of commercial bank financing.5' Each is a Fortune Global 500 company
and each is ranked among the top fifty world banks. 2 BoC recently became the
largest bank in Asia, after a large capital injection by Beijing and has 560
overseas offices in 25 countries and regions.5 3 ICBC is China's largest bank by
assets and its upcoming Hong Kong IPO, estimated to be worth $10-15 billion,
may be the world's biggest in seven years. 4  CCB, which focuses on
infrastructure, recently pulled off a successful $9.2 billion IPO, the world's
50 See Statement of Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner, US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission (July 14, 2005), available online at <http://www.uscc.gov/testimonies_
speeches/speeches/2005/05.07_1 4carolynbatholomew.htm> (visited Feb 11, 2006); S 1412,
109th Cong, 1st Sess, §1(5) (July 15, 2005); Tim LeeMaster, CNOOC Locks in $16b, The Standard
(June 29, 2005), available online at <http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_
Page/GF29Aa01.html> (visited Feb 11, 2006).
51 Economist Intelligence Unit, China Finance: Bank Binge Brings Mixed Prospects, Asia Alert (Mar 20,
2006).
52 The World's Biggest Banks 2005, Global Finance (Feb 2006), available online at <http://
www.gfmag.com/c-aw/051 003.php> (visited May 15, 2006).
53 The Top 1000 World Banks, Banker 251 (July 1, 2005); Bank of China, About Bank of China,
available online at <http://www.bank-of-china.com/en/common/third.jsp?category=
ROOT/o3Een%3EInformation+Center%3EAbout+BOC%3EAbout+Bank+of+China>
(visited May 15, 2006).
54 Credit Suisse, Deutsche, Merill Hired for ICBC IPO, Bloomberg (Mar 9, 2006), available online at
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=a3DmU9.gE6rI> (visited May
15, 2004).
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largest ever for a bank at the time."5 Meanwhile, the activities of foreign banks in
China have been limited in order to protect and nurture the Big Four and other
domestic banks. For example, ICBC has some thirty-seven thousand branches
and sub-branches across the country, while HSBC, the foreign bank with the
largest presence in China, has only twelve branches and eight sub-branches. The
assets of all 247 foreign banks still only amount to 1.6 percent of China's total
banking assets5 6
The Big Four were originally established in 1984 when China split its
monobank system into a central bank, the People's Bank of China's ("PBOC"),
and the Big Four as policy-commercial banks. The Big Four assumed the state
function of funding SOEs and were essential in assisting the SOEs provide
employment and maintain social stability.
In 1995, the new commercial bank law permitted commercial banks to
make their own decisions regarding their business operations and conduct
business operations without interference from any unit or individual; however,
the law simultaneously made clear that SOCBs must lend according to the needs
of the national economy, social development and the state's industrial policy. 7
During the same year, for example, PBOC directed the Big Four to issue 66
percent of their loans to SOEs, thereby preventing the allocation of such capital
to more profitable ventures. 8  Later reforms, which included requiring
commercial banks to make loans on a commercial basis and banning local
governments from influencing their lending decisions, were quickly undermined
when the central bank directed the banks to continue to extend loans to SOEs.59
The central bank concurrently retained its ceiling on lending rates. Without
55 Stephen Timewell, Special Supplement: China-Sights Set High, Banker 1 (Jan 1, 2006).
56 Id.
57 Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks -
(effective July 1, 1995), art 4, 34 available online at <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/rhwg/
19981802.htm> (PBOC website; in Chinese) (visited Feb 11, 2006).
58 Raymond J. Blanchard, Jr, The Heart of Economic Reform: China's Banks Struggle Under the Weight of
State-Owned Enterprise Debt, China Business Review (Dec 6, 1997), available online at
<http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/9701/blanchard.html> (visited Feb 11, 2006).
59 Nicholas R Lardy, The Challenge of Bank Restructuring in China 33 (Bank of Intl Settlements 1999),
available online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy07a.pdf> (visited Feb 11, 2006), (citing
People's Bank of China, State Economic and Trade Commission, and State General Bureau of
Taxation, (' -T - - R - M T_ I " Ak -1 ;JI *4 kt:,n: 4 A M *) (Notice
Concerning Further Supporting State-Owned Industrial Enterprises that Are Losing Money
which Have Saleable and Efficiently Produced Products), June 1998); Andrew Sheng, Bank
Restructuring: Lessons from the 1980s 101 (World Bank 1996).
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flexibility on pricing, banks preferred to lend to large, often state-owned,
enterprises with relatively established credit records.6 °
Consequently, banks have invested in uneconomic infrastructure projects
and inefficient SOEs which were driven more by the desire to keep people
employed than for a return on investment. The country uses $5 of fresh capital
for each $1 of additional output it produces, a ratio that is far worse than
Western countries and even emerging economies such as India.6 While these
soft credits have helped boost, or keep afloat, the Chinese economy, they have
burdened the Chinese banking system with an estimated $900 billion in non-
performing loans ("NPLs")-almost double official estimates and more than the
country's $875 billion in foreign reserves.6 2 Many more loans yield only negligible
returns. It is estimated that China's GDP would be a staggering $320 billion, or
16 percent, higher if SOCB lending habits improved: $60 billion from cutting
costs, improving electronic payment systems and developing bond and equity
trading, and the remaining $260 billion from redirecting loans to more
productive parts of the economy.
63
Despite these inefficiencies and risks in the domestic market, SOCBs have
leveraged on their own growing liquidity strength as well as the restrictions on
foreign banks to gain experience in large international financings. For example,
when capital requirements to meet China's voracious key construction
development demand (including power generation, water treatment and supply,
petrochemical and transportation) outstripped supply from the foreign capital
markets in the mid-1990s, SOCBs stepped up to provide financing both in local
currency and later in foreign currency.64 In time, Chinese banks began to
dominate the US dollar credits in domestic fmancings.65
60 A Stride Toward a Market Oriented Interest Rate Regime, People's Daily Online (Nov 3, 2004), available
online at <http://english.people.com.cn/200411/03/eng2004l103_l62646.html> (visited Feb
11,2006).
61 A Great Big Banking Gamble-China's Banking Industy, Economist 93 (Oct 29, 2005).
62 See Richard McGregor, China Bad Loans May Reach Total of$900b, FT.com (May 2, 2006), available
online at <https://registration.ft.com/registration/barrier?referer=http://www.bankresearch.
org/economicpolicyblog/2006/05 /china-bad-loans.htmrl&lJocation=http%3A/ /news.ft.com /cm
s/s/35808a04-da0a-llda-b7de-0000779e2340.html> (visited May 15, 2006). Ernst & Young
initially reported the $900 billion figure in Global Nonperforming Loan Report 2006. On
May 15, 2006 however, Ernst & Young retracted the report, citing a failure to properly verify its
facts.
63 Putting China's Capital to Work: The Value of Finandal System Reform, McKinsey Global Institute, Ch
4 (May 2006), available online at <http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/china_
capital/MGI_chinacapitalchapter4.pdf> (visited May 10, 2006).
64 The first notable appearance was in project financing of the Shandong Zhonghua Power Project,
where the local banks extended the yuan equivalent of $822 million of total credits of around just
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Before long, SOCBs began chasing overseas financings. These credits are
perceived to be less risky than domestic financings, thereby taking pressure off
the banks' NPL ratio. While ICBC's proposed loan to CNOOC was the most
contested of such financings, it was certainly not the first or last to assist
Chinese companies go global.
China's commitment under its World Trade Organization membership to
remove barriers to foreign investment in its financial sector by 2007 is provoking
a seismic shift for the SOCBs which will further have dramatic effects on their
global competitiveness. Beijing has invested heavily in the Big Four to prepare
them for the shock and make them internationally competitive. Since 1998,
Beijing has injected more than $260 billion of its reserves to recapitalize the Big
Four and has transferred some $330 billion worth of NPLs out of these banks
into specialized asset-management companies.66
Their transformation into joint stock companies and subsequent IPOs will
subject the Big Four to greater transparency, tighter supervision and closer
scrutiny by regulators and public shareholders. And although the majority of
China's local commercial banks are a long way from going public, most have
independent directors, have installed better shareholding and incentive
structures involving some market discipline, have adopted new risk management
systems and have tried to eliminate the conflicts of interest by separating the
roles of making and approving loans. 67 It also appears that Beijing is trying to
reduce the Communist Party's political influence in financial sector regulatory
agencies, the PBOC and the major SOCBs.6 8
Furthermore, many Chinese banks, including all of the Big Four, have
brought in foreign "strategic investors" as shareholders. Overseas investors
poured $18 billion into the Chinese banking system between late 2004 and
2005.69 The majority of foreign investors are capable of adding bank
management experience and technology and improving the credit culture of
Chinese banks.70 The Big Four will more easily achieve global supremacy with
over $1.5 billion. Mitchell Silk, Are the Chinese Banks Taking Over the World?, Project Finance
International Yearbook 89-91 (2003).
65 Id.
66 A Great Big Banking Gamble, Economist at 93 (cited in note 61).
67 Clii Lo, China's Banking Reform-What You See and What You Don't, FinanceAsia (Feb 3, 2006),
available online at <http://www.financeasia.com> (visited Mar 9, 2006).
68 United States Trade Representative, 2005 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance 75-
77 (Dec 11, 2005), available online at <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/
ReportsPublications/2005/asset-uploadfile293_8580.pdf> (visited May 15, 2006).
69 Chi Lo, China's Banking Reform (cited in note 67).
70 For example, Bank of America has sent fifty senior staff to train staff at CCB, in which Bank of
America holds a 9 percent stake, and it is reported that ICBC stakeholder Goldman Sachs has
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the help of and through cooperation with these international banks which blazed
the path before them.
B. POLICY BANKS
Besides the SOCBs, Chinese companies are able to take advantage of
favorable financing from China's policy banks.71 China formed three policy
banks in 1999 as a part of the restructuring of its banking system: China
Development Bank ("CDB") focuses on infrastructure and financing; China
EXIM specializes in trade finance; and the Agricultural Development Bank
provides funds for rural development. The policy banks accounted for 14
percent of banking assets at the end of 2003.72
Despite their primary policy mandates, the policy banks have also stepped
into the international financing arena. Both CDB and China EXIM have recently
committed to providing easier credit for enterprises going global. CDB provides
some projects, such as those that employ Chinese workers or use domestic
equipment, with an even lower interest lending rate. In November 2004, NDRC
and China EXIM announced that China EXIM would earmark a special portion
of the bank's budget for ODI in some key overseas projects together with at
least a 2 percent interest rate discount.73 China EXIM may also extend the loan
period, reduce, or even exempt guarantee funds (generally required to make sure
the companies will repatriate their profits back to China) for those enterprises.
In 2005, China EXIM received a substantial capital injection to support the bank
agreed to train ICBC's executives in corporate governance, risk management and bad loan
resolutions. Abe De Ramos, Onward with the Par*j?, CFO Asia (Dec 2005/Jan 2006), available
online at <http://www.cfoasia.com/archives/200512-1l.htm> (visited Feb 11, 2006); Francesco
Guerrera and Richard McGregor, ICBC Draws on Foreign Expertise before Listing, Fin Times 30 (Jan
27, 2006).
71 Policy banks exist in many countries and assist in macro-economic planning by providing long-
term credit at favorable rates by using government reserves.
72 John Thompson, Governance of Banks in China, in Governance in China ch 13, § 3.3.1, Org for Econ
Coop and Dev (2005), available online at <http://www.bergamo.cisl.it/repository/eddte/
files/OBJ0000841.pdf> (visited Feb 13, 2006).
73 Notice concerning the policy on providing credit and loan support for key overseas investment
projects encouraged by the State ( 'I ,-
OAO), jointly issued by SDRC and ETB on Oct2, 2004, available online at
<http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/zcfbtz2004/t20050613_7160.htm> (NDRC website;
Chinese) (visited Feb 11, 2006). The four types of projects that can receive interest-subsidized
loans are: (i) overseas development projects that can supplement energy resources; (ii) overseas
manufacturing and infrastructure projects that can support the export of domestic technology,
products, equipment and labor; (iii) overseas research and development projects that will utilize
advanced global technology, managerial skills and talents; and (iv) overseas M&A projects that
will enhance enterprises' international competitiveness and help them develop international
markets.
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in these efforts.7 4 A China EXIM insider has stated that the bank makes its own
credit decisions: "We abide by the principle of independent decision-making and
the NDRC does not interfere."7 However, where a project is supported by the
government, China EXIM may receive interest subsidies from its direct parent,
the Ministry of Finance, for loans extended below its own cost of funding-
which is more explicit support than that provided to any of the SOCBs or other
policy banks.7 6
Well-established companies such as Huawei and newcomers such as Qirui
Automobile Co. Ltd. (which plans to enter the US automobile market under the
name Chery) have benefited from this more direct form of Chinese financial
support.77 CDB has also penned strategic partnership agreements with a number
of SOEs and has committed to provide $8.6 billion in loans for seventeen
overseas investment projects. 8 Despite the increasing independence and
commercialization of the SOCBs, it is clear that the policy banks are ready to
step in and continue to promote the Go Global policy on favorable terms.
V. WHY HAVEN'T THE CHINESE TAKEN OVER YET?
Chinese companies have been spoiled by their parent. They enjoy state
welfare, a favorable domestic policy environment and have $875 billion in
foreign exchanges reserves at their disposal. Foreign companies have reason to
be concerned over the new kids on the block. But despite these favorable
conditions for global supremacy, Chinese companies still face numerous
domestic and foreign hurdles that stand in the way of their achieving their fullest
economic potential.
74 China Increases Reserves for 'Go Out'Plan, Asian Wall St J (July 12, 2005).
75 Xin Zhiming, Further Liberakzation Ky to Fuelling China's Global Buying Spree, Caijing Magazine (Sept
19, 2005), available online at <http://caijing.hexun.com/english/detail.aspx?issue=142&sl =
2486&d= 1334339> (visited Feb 11, 2006).
76 S&P Rates Exim Bank of China's Planned Global Notes BBB+, Dow Jones (July 4, 2005).
77 FutureWei, China Development Bank Offers Huawei Technologies Credit Finandng of USD10 Billion to
Support Its International Expansion (Dec 30, 2004), available online at
<http://www.futurewei.com/detail.asp?dt=news&id=80> (visited Feb 11, 2006); Huawei, China
EXIM Bank and Huawei Signed $600 Million Export Buyer's Credit Framework Agreement (Feb 14,
2004), available online at <http://www.huawei.com/news/view.do?id=275&cid=42> (visited
Feb 11, 2006); The Export-Import Bank of China, China Eximbank Signed with Qirui Company
Cooperation Agreement of Providing RMB 5 billion Export Credit SupportforQirui International Operation,
available online at <http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/info/Artide.jsp?a-no=834&colno=84>
(visited May 15, 2006).
78 Zhiming, Further I'beraliZation Key, Caijing Magazine (cited in note 75).
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A. BEIJING HAS NOT DONE ENOUGH
Despite China's recent history of a planned economy, including well-
designed incentives for FDI into China, China has been relatively hands-off in
promoting outbound investment. A number of reforms enacted to encourage
ODI have simply dissolved onerous barriers to investment held over from the
days of the Investment System. One government official has admitted that
"[g]overnment policy, notably 'going global' and its related incentive measures as
a push factor, influence Chinese companies' ODI decisions only as a secondary
factor., 79 The chairman of ZTE has even criticized the lack of state support.8"
Part of this insouciance stems from the lack of an absolute mandate for
any of China's bureaucratic arms. Unlike Japan's powerful Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Beijing's has never bestowed the power to
effectively coordinate ODI to one ministry. NDRC, MOFCOM, SASAC, SAFE
and, for financial institutions, CBRC continue to manage ODI at some level.
Each has an incentive to continue to regulate ODI in order to participate in the
celebrated campaign to Go Global, resulting in multiple layers of sometimes
contradictory regulations. For example, in October 2004 NDRC issued rules
which prohibit Chinese legal entities from signing definitive agreements until
they have obtained NDRC approval, making such conditional bids less attractive
to targets than competitive unconditional bids.8' Some commentators have cited
the delay and uncertainty of NDRC approval as a cause in China Minmetal's
failure to acquire Canadian nickel and copper mining giant Noranda.82
Chinese companies also face additional governmental restraints. Provincial
protectionism often prevents companies from consolidating their market
position by acquiring competitors in other provinces. Other companies, such as
Shanghai Baosteel Group ("Baosteel") in the 1990s, saw a drop in profitability
after being forced to absorb its less efficient competitors.83 Most SOEs are
unable to reduce workforces because of the premium placed on low
unemployment and social stability and SOEs in industries such as coal, crude oil,
79 Jiang Wei, Outward Direct Investment Set to Increase, China Daily 10 (Sept 27, 2005), quoting Yu
Jianlong, director of the Economic Information Department of China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade.
80 Mure Dickie, Staring a Walk on the Wide Side; Going Global Strategy: For Some Companies, Becoming
International Is a Necessity Not a Choice, Fin Times 4 (Oct 19, 2005).
81 Tentative Administrative Rules on Approval of Offshore Investments Projects
(AAR , la R 4 WITPA), available online at <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/
zcfb12004/t20051010_44801.htm> (NDRC website; Chinese) (visited Feb 11, 2006).
82 Zhiming, Further liberakation Key, Caijing Magazine (cited in note 75).
83 We Are the Champions, Economist at 12 (cited in note 4).
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electric power, water supply, transportation and trade incur losses because the
state sets the prices of their products below market.84
B. CHINESE COMPANIES STILL LAG FOREIGN COMPETITORS
As discussed above, many SOEs are less efficient than their global
competitors, a critical component of long-term economic growth. In 2003, the
average profit rate of net assets in SOEs was only 5 percent. About 10 percent
of SOEs face deficits.8" Excess capacity is becoming an increasing problem. And
SOEs continue to hold on to historical "social burdens" such as schools,
hospitals, restaurants and other assets unrelated to their main businesses. Under
a pilot program in late 2004, CNPC, Sinopec and Dongfeng Motor transferred
796 primary and middle schools, public security organs and 94,000 workers
(including retired teachers) to local governments.86 China plans to establish a way
of evaluating the performance of SOEs in order to raise efficiency, but the
program is scheduled to begin as late as 2010.
Others suffer from the lack of capable management personnel. MOFCOM
stated the acute scarcity of Chinese leadership talent is the main barrier to the
global ambitions of Chinese companies. China's aspiring global champions will
need as many as seventy-five thousand globally-capable leaders over the next ten
to fifteen years, from a base of only around three thousand to five thousand last
year.8" For this reason, Lenovo asked top IBM managers to continue to run the
entire company from New York and CNOOC was looking to do likewise.
Most Chinese companies simply lack adequate international experience.
Huawei, for example, has had success in the Middle East and Latin America,
where it leveraged reduced costs from government financing such as a low-cost
$10 billion loan from CDB in 2004 and a $600 million credit line from China
84 For example, China's domestic airline industry is hampered by regulated ticket prices, the
government is planning to raise landing charges in order to bail out loss-making airports and a
domestic jet-fuel monopoly means fuel accounts for an average of 40 percent of costs at Chinese
airlines, compared with 24 percent for airlines worldwide. On a Wing and a Prayer, Economist 70
(Feb 25, 2006).
85 China Plans to Monitor Performance of State Companies, BBC Monitoring International Reports (Dec
20, 2004).
86 China's State-Owned Enterprises Act to Improve Competiiveness, BBC Monitoring International Reports
(Dec 1, 2004).
87 MOFCOM, Narrowing China's Corporate Leadership Gap (May 18, 2005), available online at <http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/asiareport/200505/20050500093533.htnl>
(visited May 15, 2006).
Summer 2006
Silk and Mahsh
Chicago Journal of International Law
EXIM Bank to promote its international operations. 8" In the US, however,
marketing problems, intellectual property suits and human resources blunders
have shown Huawei, according to their North America business-development
director that they "still have a long way to go to learn about [the US market] 9
Chinese companies must also learn to deal with different management styles and
cultures. Legal regimes and regulatory oversight, including capital markets
transparency standards, may also be completely "foreign" to Chinese companies
in comparison to investors from developed economies.
C. CHINESE BANKS MUST CONTINUE TO REFORM
Despite the emergence of SOCBs and their position as some of the top
revenue earners in the world, numerous systemic issues remain and beg to be
addressed. China's banking industry was technically insolvent before its recent
restructuring. The Big Four currently report an NPL ratio (as a percentage of
total loans) of just under 10 percent90 and government figures value the problem
at $210 billion. However, this ignores the transferred NPLs which have yet to be
resolved, "performing loans" which may need to be reclassified and NPLs
anticipated from the new loose lending over the past three years. NPLs would
be less of an issue if the banks were making profits to counterbalance their
liabilities. However, the return on assets generated by China's banks, at less than
0.5 percent in 2005, is the worst in Asia. Chinese banks are too dependent on
loan income (Western banks make a good percentage of their fees from advisory
services and related services such as credit cards) and their interest margins are
not high enough to cover the risks typical of an emerging economy.9 The NPL
problem reveals a larger problem of inefficient allocation of resources. Interest-
rate flexibility and a reduction in government interference is necessary to shift
credits away from legacy SOEs to new market players with the potential for
greater profitability. The ability of SOCBs to assist in the growth of corporate
88 FutureWei, China Development Bank Offers Huawei Technologies Credit Financing (cited in note 77);
Huawei, China EXIM Bank and Huawei Signed $600 Million Export Buyer's Credit Framework Agreement
(cited in note 77).
89 Christopher Rhoads and Rebecca Buckman, Trial and Enrr: A Chinese Telecom Powerhouse Stumbles
on Road to the US, Wall StJ Al (July 28, 2005).
90 The CBRC reported that average problem loan ratio of the mainland's Big Four state banks and
twelve joint stock lenders for the first time fell below 10 percent in 2005. However, adding back a
RMB 705 billion non-performing loan carve-out by ICBC in June 2005, the lenders would have
seen a net increase of RMB 206.5 billion of NPLs (analysts often add back such one-off carve-
outs to show the underlying trend of NPL generation, hence the lenders' ability to sustain the low
NPL ratios without further bailouts). Mainland Lenders Cut NPL Ratio to under lOpe, South China
Morning Post 3 (Jan 19, 2006).
91 A Great Big Banking Gamble, Economist at 93 (cited in note 61).
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China is highly dependent on the resolution of the NPL problem and other
systemic issues.
Despite foreign investments in China's bank and financial services sector in
recent years, minority investment is generally limited to 25 percent and the banks
are still accountable only to the government, thereby precluding the
development of a truly commercial culture. Bank management has traditionally
been selected from inside the ministerial system and their mandate is not to
return shareholder value or even to protect the interest of the owners, but rather
to yield to a variety of pressures from the Central Government, the Communist
Party or local governments.92 Additional oversight is also needed to preclude
further corruption scandals which have plagued the SOCBs at all levels. The
China Banking Regulatory Commission ("CBRC' discovered irregularities
involving RMB 767 billion at mainland banks in 2005, resulting in 1,205 financial
institutions being penalized and 6,826 bank officials reprimanded. CBRC has
even accused 1,228 of its own staff of being involved with $10.4 million in
irregular funds in 2005.9'
There have been a series of improvements in regulation, including the
establishment of the CBRC in 2003 to take over the PBOC's oversight of
SOCBs. There have also been substantial improvements in critical areas of asset
classification and provisioning and capital adequacy. 94 To the extent these
reforms are successful, they will assist Chinese banks to grow and compete
internationally. The reforms are also necessary under the laws of foreign
jurisdictions, such as the US Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of
1991 ("FBSEA"), 9' to establish and upgrade overseas representative offices and
branches to facilitate more integrated support to Chinese multinationals.
Lastly, the dependence on and overwhelming issues involved in China's
banking system have overshadowed the need for alternative financing options.
Modern global economies equally rely on functioning capital markets as banks to
help raise capital and efficiently allocate it for sustained economic growth. In
2005, China's two stock exchanges were considered the world's two worst in
terms of performance.96 Beijing suspended IPOs in May 2005 to stabilize the
92 Thompson, Governance ofBanks in China, at ch 13, § 3.3.1 (cited in note 72).
93 China Banking Graft Seeping Into Regulatoy Body, Agence France Presse (Feb 20, 2006).
94 Richard Podpiera, Progress in China's Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behavior Changed?, International
Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/06/71, 19 (Mar 2006).
95 For a discussion on the objectives and implementation of the Act, see Ann E. Misback, The
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Jan 1993).
96 China's Stock Market Needs Structural Refor, People's Daily (Mar 22, 2006), available online at
<http://english.people.com.cn/200503/22/eng2005032Z_177747.html> (visited May 15, 2006),
quoting Donald Straszheim, former chief economist at Merrill Lynch.
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market as it trickles some $250 billion worth of government-owned holdings
into the market. Recent reforms are promising, although they are too nascent to
judge whether the market will see substantive short-term benefits.
D. FOREIGN POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO
CHINESE INVESTMENT
The outbound expansion of Chinese companies has been couched in a
policy of "peaceful emergence. ' 97 However, Chinese ODI has raised ire
throughout the world, espionage scandals aside.
The backlash against China's emergence has been particularly acute in the
United States. In 2004, only $120 million, or about 2 percent of the total $5.5
billion, of new Chinese ODI was directed towards the US,98 compared to US
FDI in China that was almost $4 billion and accounted for 6.15 percent of
China's $64 billion total FDI in 2004.99 But that small slice of investment has
attracted the most substantial objections. Such challenges create an increased
completion risk that forces Chinese companies to compensate sellers with what
has been termed a "Chinese buyer premium."
Some of the objections to Chinese investment in the US have been largely
driven by "economic nationalism" of competing bidders and vested interests of
the acquisition targets. The same factor which attracted Haier to Maytag-the
latter's brand recognition in US homes and market penetration-equally hurt
Haier's chances of success as the bid attracted greater public scrutiny. Haier is
majority-owned by the Qingdao city government'00 and the firm's chief
executive, Zhang Ruimin, is a ranking member of the Communist Party. Despite
97 See China's Peaceful Development Road, People's Daily (Dec 22, 2005), available online at <http://
english.people.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222 230059.html> (visited Feb 11, 2006) (the policy
was later dubbed "peaceful development" after criticism that the original slogan itself could be
seen as provocative). The Chinese Government has formulated this policy to allay fears of a
"Chinese invasion" and counter the image developed by previous espionage scandals and
attempts to acquire military technology through the acquisition of interests in US high-tech
companies. See The Cox Repo (1999), US House of Representatives Select Committee on US
National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,
available online at <http://www.house.gov/coxreport/> (visited Feb 11, 2006).
98 Zhang, Going Global at 12 (cited in note 16).
99 US State Dept, 2005 Investment Climate Statement, available online at <http://hongkong.
usconsulate.gov/uscn/trade/sprpt/2005/ics.htm (visited May 15, 2006).
100 In a high-profile case in 2004, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission ruled that Haier was owned by the Qingdao government. Richard McGregor, Chinese
Plan to Boost Power of Managers Sparks Backlash, Fin Times 2 (Dec 15, 2004).
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Maytag's weaknesses and the fact that Haier was arguably overpaying, critics
argued that state ties could give the firm unfair financial support.01
The majority of contested Chinese acquisitions, however, have invoked
issues of national security. Section 721 (the "Exon-Florio provision") of the
Defense Production Act of 195002 provides authority to the US President to
suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger or takeover of a US
corporation that is determined to threaten the national security of the US.
Review of any such merger or acquisition is delegated to the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS"). The Committee has thirty
days to decide whether to investigate a case and an additional forty-five days to
make its recommendation. Once the recommendation is made, the President has
fifteen days to act." 3 Although CFIUS's reviews are confidential, it is believed
CFIUS has received more than fifteen hundred notifications, of which twenty-
five resulted in full investigations. Of these twenty-five cases, thirteen
transactions were withdrawn upon notice that CFIUS would conduct a full
review and twelve of the remaining cases were sent to the President.0 4 Of these
twelve transactions, the only transaction that was prohibited was the acquisition
of aerospace parts manufacturer Mamco Manufacturing Company by state-
owned China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation
("CATIC") because of concerns that CATIC might gain access to technology
through Mamco that it would otherwise have to obtain under an export
license.0
5
In 1995, two Chinese companies, San Huan New Materials and China
Non-Ferrous Materials, in partnership with two US investors, purchased
Indiana-based Magnequench. At the time, Magnequench made 85 percent of the
rare-earth magnets used in precision-guided weapons or "smart bombs"
supplied to the US military. CFIUS approved the sale on the condition that the
company's manufacturing facility would remain in the US. However, in 2003, the
101 Ben White, Whir/ool Presents an Unsolicited Bid to Buj Rival Majtaq, Wash Post A7 (July 18, 2005).
102 Section 721 of the Act codified at 50 App USC § 2170 (as amended by section 5021 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-418).
103 For information on CFIUS, see US Department of the Treasury's website at <http://www.treas.
gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/> (visited May 15, 2006).
104 Congressional Research Service, China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal: Issues for Congress 13 (Sept 15,
2005), available online at <http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33093_20050915.pdf> (visited May
15, 2006).
105 Id; see also President George Bush, Message to the Congress on the China National Aero-Technology
Import and Export Cotporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated, 1990 Pub Papers 144
(Feb 1, 1990).
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Chinese owners shut down Magnequench's Indiana production plant and moved
equipment to China, a move many in Congress bitterly remember.
0 6
In 2003, Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Whampoa made a joint bid with
Singapore Technology Telemedia to acquire Global Crossing. US officials raised
concerns that foreign ownership of Global Crossing's fiber-optics network
might make the US government vulnerable to eavesdropping from overseas and
certain of Hutchinson Whampoa's operations were reported to have ties with
the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Hutchinson Whampoa withdrew from
the bid upon CFIUS's decision to review the transaction (Singapore Technology
Telemedia eventually completed the acquisition).' 7
In 2004, Lenovo's $1.7 billion acquisition of US-based IBM's personal
computer division made it through CFIUS's gauntlet. 8 Lenovo is majority-
owned by Legend Group, which itself is majority-owned by the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, China's top scientific research body. The transaction was
challenged by congressmen arguing that the deal would result in the transfer of
sensitive technology to a potential US rival and that it would result in certain US
government contracts involving PCs being fulfilled by the Chinese government.
After closed-door negotiations with CFIUS and reports of various concessions,
the deal was allowed to proceed.
However, it was CNOOC's $18.5 billion bid for US-based Unocal in 2005
that was the most contentious attempted acquisition. CNOOC is a Hong Kong-
listed firm, 70 percent of which is owned by China National Offshore Oil
Corporation, an unlisted Chinese SOE. Over forty US congressmen protested
the CNOOC-Unocal deal on energy-security concerns.'0 9 Four bills were
introduced in Congress that directly sought to obstruct or prohibit CNOOC's
bid for Unocal." ° Accusations of unfair advantage also plagued the dialogue.
106 See Todd Bullock and Katie Xiao, Bush Administration Says Review of Chinese Unocal Bid Premature,
USINFO, available online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Jul/19-919521.htrnl>
(visited May 15, 2006).
107 Congressional Research Service, China and the CNOOC Bidfor Unocalat 13 (cited in note 104).
108 IBM kept a 13.4 percent stake in the combined company. See Simon London and Mure Dickie,
Lenovo Begins Full Integration of IBM PC Unit, Fin Times 33 (Sept 30, 2005).
109 Justin Blum, CNOOC Requests US Securiy Scrutiny, Wash Post D2 (June 28, 2005).
110 HR 344, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (June 29, 2005) (expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that a Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of critical US
energy infrastructure and energy production capacity could take action that would threaten to
impair the national security of the US. Calls on the President to make a thorough review if the
deal takes place); HR Amdt 431, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (June 30, 2005) to Transportation,
Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, HR 3058, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (une 24, 2005)
(prohibits the use of funds from being made available to recommend approval of the sale of
Unocal to CNOOC); S 1412, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (July 15, 2005) (a bill to prohibit the merger,
Vol. 7 No. 1
Are Chinese Companies Taking Over the World?
Chevron, the competing bidder, and numerous congressmen voiced concerns
that the financing was an unfair government subsidy."'
In explaining why it withdrew the bid, CNOOC stated that the company
had
given active consideration to further improving the terms of its offer, and
would have done so but for the political environment in the US. The
unprecedented political opposition that followed the announcement of our
proposed transaction, attempting to replace or amend the CFIUS process
that has been successfully in operation for decades, was regrettable and
unjustified.11 2
CNOOC's CEO later even stated that it would be willing to ask Beijing to
reduce its majority stake in the company to remove future political obstacles to
overseas acquisitions." 3
US criticism has not stopped the Chinese M&A spree, especially in other
parts of the world where Chinese money has generally been more welcome.
During the congressional debates over the CNOOC bid, congressmen noted
that blocking the deal would merely push China into making more acquisitions
or supply arrangements elsewhere in the world-possibly with countries adverse
to US interests.'
1 4
But signs of discontent are appearing outside of the US as well. In Latin
America, local politicians argue against contracts with loans tied to the execution
of projects by Chinese contractors, extraction of local resources and loss of
acquisition, or takeover of Unocal by CNOOC); Energy Policy Act of 2005, HR 6, 109th Cong,
1st Sess, § 1837 (Apr 18, 2005) (requires a study by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security of the growing energy requirements of China and the implications of such growth on the
political, strategic, economic, or national security interests of the United States. The study would
include an assessment of the relationship between the Chinese government and energy-related
businesses located in China and delays CFIUS from concluding a review of sensitive international
energy mergers until after release of the report).
II1 Steve Lohr, The Big Tug of War Over Unocal, NY Times Cl (uly 6, 2005); CNOOC Drops $18.5 Bln
Unocal Bid Amid US Opposition, Bloomberg (Aug 2, 2005), available online at
<htp://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000006&sid=ah3uSZmkLLBI&refer=home>
(visited Feb 11, 2006); Ben White, ShareholderAdisoy Firm Backs Chevron Bid for Unocal, Wash Post
D1 (Aug 2, 2005). Furthermore, the Commissioner of the USCC criticized the fact that the
governor of China's central bank helped assemble the acquisition financing. Statement of Carolyn
Bartholomew (cited in note 50).
112 CNOOC Limited, CNOOC Limited to Withdraw Unocal Bid (Aug 2, 2005), available online at
<http://www.cnoocltd.com/press/channel/press1616.asp> (visited May 15, 2006).
113 Richard McGregor and Francesco Guerrera, CNOOC Wilng to Ask Bei/ing to Reduce Stake, Fin
Times 28 (Oct 27, 2005).
114 Congressional Research Service, China and the CNOOCBidfor Unocalat 5-6 (cited in note 104).
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economic free will." 5 Many question how well the multi-billion dollar letters of
intent President Hu signed with Latin American countries in 2004 will
materialize into formal investment. For example, Baosteel's celebrated
announcement in 2004 of plans to build a $2.5 billion steel mill in Brazil with
Europe-based Arcelor has been put on hold due to world steel prices; however
the investors have also been put off by two years of waiting for zoning approval
and concerns over Brazilian plans to levy a tax on machinery imported for the
plant."16
The acquisition of PetroKazakhstan also lit nationalistic fires in
Kazakhstan, where a proposal was introduced in parliament to revoke the
company's licenses to remove oil and gas from the country. In December 2002,
after being formally invited to bid for Slavnet, Russia's ninth biggest oil
company, Sinopec was forced to drop out after the Russian parliament passed a
resolution opposing the acquisition." 7 Minmetals' bid for Noranda prompted
some members of Canada's Parliament to review whether the Investment
Canada Act, which requires government reviews of direct acquisitions worth
more than C$237 million, needed updating."8
VI. CONCLUSION
Since moving towards a market economy, Beijing has fostered its state-
owned companies to grow large domestically and spread their wings overseas.
SOCBs are learning to allocate capital efficiently, a boon to both their own
balance sheets and to borrowers, and strategic investments by foreign investors
are bringing in expertise to help turn the banks into truly commercial
enterprises. Chinese companies are preparing themselves to stake their claims in
the global marketplace. Yet despite the beneficial conditions for expansion,
Chinese companies have been hampered domestically and internationally. On
the domestic front, Chinese regulatory oversight continues to restrict foreign
investment. Political and social considerations preclude efficient allocation of
resources, thereby dragging down both productivity and bank profits. Chinese
companies also lack management capabilities and international experience to
effectively deal with issues such as different corporate cultures and the demands
115 China and Latin America: Magic, or Realism?, Economist.com (Dec 29, 2004) available online at
<http://www.econonist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3521240> (visited May 15,
2006).
116 See Trade &Investment, Latin American Special Reports (cited in note 44).
117 Mark O'Neill, Small Firms Look Abroad as CNOOC's Unocal Bid Stalls, South China Morning Post 2
(uly 12, 2005).
118 Robert Thompson, Resources Should Not Be Foreign-Controlled: CEOs: 42% Want Greater Limits,
Financial Post (Ont) 2 (Dec 13, 2004).
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of foreign legal and regulatory regimes. Foreign countries and competitors have
also fought tooth-and-nail to keep Chinese companies from moving into their
backyard.
China is actively pushing to address these issues. China's Go Global policy
is still nascent, and the next few years we should see continued refinement of the
ODI framework. One commentator has stated, "one proof of the genius of the
Chinese businessman is that he can succeed in a system that has so many
restrictions."" 9 Imagine what will happen when these restrictions are removed!
Beijing's ability to promptly and efficiently tackle these issues is crucial to the
future role of Chinese companies in the global marketplace.
119 Ted C. Fishman, China Inc. 65 (Scribner 2005), quoting Zurui Tang, economic investigator at
Peking University and INSEAD.
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